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SUBROGATION AND INSOLVENCY
ALAN 0. SYKES*

ABSTRACT

When tort judgments exceed the assets of tortfeasors and the tort victim has first-party
insurance for a portion of the loss suffered, the question arises as to how the recovery
from the tortfeasor should be divided between' the tort victim on the one hand and the
insurer via its rights of subrogation on the other. A common view among the courts and
legal commentators is that the insured should be made whole before the insurer recovers
subrogation. This paper employs simple models of optimal insurance contracts to show
that the opposite rule will often be optimal. Accordingly, there is little basis for judicial
interference with freedom of contract when the insurance agreement provides that the
insurer must be made whole before the insured receives any portion of the recovery. The
analysis also provides some support for allowing the insurer to take first as a default rule
at common law.

"SUBROGATION" is "the substitution of one person in place of another
with reference to a lawful claim."' For example, if Blue Cross/Blue Shield
pays the medical expenses of a policyholder who has been injured by a
negligent driver, Blue Cross/Blue Shield may then have the right to recover
those expenses from the negligent party in a subrogation action. If the insured
has already received money from the injurer, the insured may hold such funds
in "constructive trust" for the insurer because of the insurer's subrogation
rights. An action by the insurer against the insured to recover such funds is
often termed an action for "reimbursement."
Subrogation rights are common in insurance relationships and may arise
by contract or at common law. In most jurisdictions, the common law provides
a subrogation right to insurers under property, liability, and some casualty
policies. Although subrogation was not generally available at common law
in health and medical policies, most such policies now include subrogation
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clauses expressly.'
When injurers are fully solvent-able to pay damages judgments against
them in full-subrogation (or reimbursement) prevents the injured party from
achieving a double recovery (one from the insurer and one from the injurer).
The public policy against such "windfalls" is an oft-stated rationale for subrogation.3 An economist might rephrase the policy concern as one for excessive
moral hazard that might arise if injured parties actually came out ahead after
an accident, as well as one for suboptimal risk bearing that would arise if riskaverse insureds were more than made whole after covered losses. For these
reasons, the insurer's right of subrogation is clearly part of the optimal insurance
contract when injurers are fully solvent. Similarly, if all of the insured's losses
are covered by first-party insurance, subrogation is also plainly optimal
(whether or not the injurer is fully solvent) because the insured is made whole
by first-party coverage. Any recovery by the insured from the injurer under
these circumstances would again be a "double recovery."
The more difficult case-and the case that has been the subject of considerable litigation-arises when the injurer is not fully solvent and the insured's losses are not fully covered by first-party insurance. If the injurer
has no assets at all, of course, the nature of subrogation rights is of no
consequence. But suppose that an injurer has some assets, though less than
the insured's total loss (I will term such injurers "partially solvent"), and that
the insured has been made partially whole by first-party insurance benefits.
How should the injurer's limited assets be divided between the insurer and
the insured? To make it concrete, suppose that an insured has been injured
by a negligent driver and a first-party insurer has paid medical bills in the
amount of $200,000. The insured has no other applicable insurance coverage.
The insured obtains a judgment against the negligent driver in the amount
of $500,000, reflecting the $200,000 in medical bills, $100,000 in lost wages,
and $200,000 in pain and suffering. The tortfeasor has assets of $200,000.
Claiming subrogation rights, the insurer then insists that it is entitled to this
$200,000. Should such a claim be allowed? At common law? If the insurance
contract provides for it? To my knowledge, these issues have not been addressed in the law and economics literature.4
The courts have been forced to address them, however, and have come to
2

See John F. Dobbyn, Insurance Law in a Nutshell 285-90 (3d ed. 1996). The common-law logic

in providing or denying subrogation for different types of policies is interesting in its own right and
raises puzzles that are beyond the scope of the analysis here. Life insurers are not entitled to
subrogation, for example, on the rather artificial theory that they contract not to cover the economic
losses of the insured but rather to pay a stipulated sum in the event of the insured's death-their
contract is more of an investment than an insurance contract, it is often said. Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 284.
The issues are addressed in a fine student note, Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Insurance and Subrogation:
Where the Pie Isn't Big Enough, Who Eats Last? 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337 (1997). Greenblatt does
not employ the tools of insurance economics used here, however, and thus his analysis is quite
different from the analysis in this paper.
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no consensus. According to John Dobbyn, "In the absence of stipulations to
the contrary in the insurance contract, the majority of courts direct that the
insured is to be compensated first . . . to the extent to which his loss exceeds

the insurance proceeds." 5 This rule is sometimes called the "made-whole
doctrine"-the insured must be made whole before the insurer can recover
anything. Dobbyn's statement of the made-whole doctrine suggests that parties to an insurance contract can readily agree to alternative arrangements,
but in fact a number of courts insist that the insured be made whole before
the insurer receives anything despite a seemingly clear provision to the contrary in the contract.6 Other courts do allow the insurer to recover first if the
contract so provides. 7 Still others have applied a sharing rule that divides
the recovery in proportion to the losses borne by the insurer and the insured.8
Which of these approaches, if any, is the best? A naive response rests on
the simple observation that the insured is risk averse and the insurer is
approximately risk neutral. Therefore, one might suggest, optimal risk sharing
requires that the insurer recover nothing until the insured has been made
whole. Some commentators, including Kenneth Abraham in his well-known
insurance treatise, argue from this intuition against any subrogation recovery
by the insurer that would impair the insured's ability to obtain full indemnity.9
This line of thinking is mistaken, however, for it ignores the question of
why the insured was underinsured in the first place. One reason for underinsurance is that risk-averse individuals do not desire insurance against all
legally compensable losses-only those losses that cause the marginal utility
of money to increase relative to other states of nature. Another reason for
underinsurance relates to the fact that the price of insurance often is not
"actuarially fair." Underinsurance may also arise because devices such as
coinsurance and deductibles are valuable for controlling moral hazard. This
paper explores these possibilities with the aid of simple formal models and
sets out the optimal subrogation rule for each case.
The analysis suggests that it is optimal under a wide range of circumstances
for insurers to be reimbursed in full before insureds receive anything from
the partially solvent injurer, even though the consequence is that the insured
is not made whole. The details depend on the reason why the insured lacks
Dobbyn, supra note 2, at 293.
6 See Garrity v. Rural Mutual Insurance Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977); Rimes v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982); Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d 464 (1993); Powell v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 581 S.2d 772 (Ala. 1990). In Powell, for example, the
policy provided that "separate from and in addition to the Administrator's right of subrogation . . . [t]he right to reimbursement of the Administrator comes first even if a Member is not
paid for all of his claim for damages." 581 S.2d at 774.
See Gibson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 193 Ill. App. 3d 87, 549 N.E.2d 23 (1990).
See Magsipoc v. Larsen, 639 S.2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory and Public Policy 155 (1986).
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full coverage for losses, but the general intuition may be expressed as follows:
from the standpoint of optimal risk allocation, the fortuitous presence of an
injurer who is liable for the insured's losses does not affect the risk that the
insured should optimally bear. Thus, if it is optimal for the insured to bear
the risk of uncovered losses associated with accidents in which no injurer is
liable, the insured should bear the same risk in accidents in which an injurer
is liable. Accordingly, no violence is done to optimal risk sharing if the
insurer is reimbursed first by the partially insolvent injurer. The caveats all
relate to the possibility that underinsurance is not optimal for the insured,
presumably because of some market failure (at least relative to the first best).
The analysis is the same whether the case against the injurer is litigated
to conclusion or is settled. I mention the latter group of cases only because
they present a special problem for the made-whole doctrine: when an insured
settles with a partially solvent injurer, the insured can credibly argue that the
settlement amount is less than the amount that a court would have awarded
at the conclusion of litigation (because the settlement negotiations took into
account the injurer's limited assets) and thus that the settlement is not enough
to make the insured whole. Yet because of the settlement, the amount required
to make the insured whole will not be independently determined by a court
as part of the action against the injurer. As a result, some courts considering
reimbursement claims have required a "minitrial" under the made-whole
doctrine to determine the insured's loss.' 0 If the made-whole doctrine is a
mistake, however, such actions are unnecessary.
I will proceed by considering in turn various explanations for the insured's
lack of complete coverage against loss. A concluding section gathers the
results and summarizes their implications for the law.
I.

NONPECUNIARY LOSSES

Insurance markets arise because it is valuable for individuals to shift money
from "states of nature" in which the marginal utility of money is low (ordinary
situations in which the insured pays premiums) to states in which the marginal
utility of money is high (situations in which a covered loss has occurred and
the insured receives a positive net payment from the insurance company).
Conventional insurance economics further posits that the marginal utility of
money is diminishing for individuals and, hence, that the states in which the
marginal utility of money is high will ordinarily be the states in which the
insured's wealth has suffered a significant decline."
In personal injury cases, however, substantial damages are regularly awarded
for nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering. Such awards are defensible
0

See Rimes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.; Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue

Cross and Blue Shield.
" Classic treatments of insurance economics may be found in Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the
Theory of Risk Bearing (1974); Karl H. Borch, Economics of Insurance (1990).
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on optimal deterrence grounds, as the social cost of accidents assuredly includes
these nonmonetary harms. But it does not follow that such harms should be
or are insurable or that the rules of subrogation ought to shift to an insurer the
risk that an insured may be unable to collect these awards from a partially
solvent injurer.
Indeed, we do not observe pain and suffering insurance in the marketplace,
for at least two reasons. First, the monetary value of pain and suffering is
not readily ascertainable, and pain is often difficult to verify. Pain and suffering insurance might then create significant moral hazards, at least for
certain types of accidents. Second, and perhaps more fundamental, it is hardly
clear that the marginal utility of money is higher for people in states of the
world in which they experience pain and suffering. If their economic losses
(such as medical expenses) in those states are covered by insurance, the
marginal utility of additional dollars may well be lower rather than higher
in comparison to other states of the world because a person suffering pain
may be less able to enjoy consumption expenditures. 2 And if that is the case,
it will be irrational for them to reduce their wealth (by paying insurance
premiums) in states in which the marginal utility of money is higher in order
to receive money in states in which it is lower. A fortiori, the made-whole
doctrine will be undesirable at least to the extent that it requires the insurer
to forfeit subrogation rights until the insured has been fully compensated for
pain and suffering.
This proposition can be illustrated and elaborated using a simple model.
Consider an insured who maximizes expected utility. The insured's (Von
Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function is un(w) in the "no-accident" state
of nature and Ua(W) in an "accident" state, where w denotes wealth. The
difference in utility across the no-accident and accident states reflects the
nonpecuniary loss attributable to the accident. Thus, we imagine that
u,(w) > Ua(W) at every wealth level.

I make the conventional assumption that utility is increasing in wealth but
that marginal utility is decreasing in wealth (the utility functions are upward
sloping and strictly concave). Let p denote the probability of an accident. If
an accident occurs, the probability that an injurer will be held liable is pl.
The probability that no injurer will be held liable is P2 (perhaps the injurer
2 The point has been made by others, including Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident
Law 233-34 (1987). Shavell also notes that there may be a divergence between the optimal damages
award for insurance purposes and the optimal award for deterrence purposes. Where, for example,
insureds would not desire insurance against nonpecuniary losses, the optimal award for insurance
purposes would not include them. Yet because nonpecuniary losses are a real cost of accidents,
optimal deterrence may require that injurers bear those costs. There may then arise a case for
"decoupling" damages paid from damages received or for using fines paid to the state in lieu of
some of the damages paid to victims, particularly if the liability rule is strict liability rather than
negligence (the issue does not arise in negligence models for the most part because no one is ever
rationally negligent in equilibrium). See id. at 247-54. The results here are very much related to
Shavell's on these points.
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cannot be found, the injurer is not negligent, or the accident is caused by
the insured). Thus, p = PA + P2.
In the event of an accident, the insured suffers a pecuniary loss equal to
L. The initial wealth of the insured is z. The insured can purchase insurance
coverage, and the amount of coverage can depend on whether an injurer is
liable for the accident or not. Let C, be the amount of coverage when an
injurer is liable for the accident, and let C2 be the amount of coverage when
no injurer is liable. In this model, I assume that the price of insurance is
actuarially fair (that the expected value of the insurance policy net of premiums paid is zero) and will denote the insurance premium by 7r. I will
further assume that the insured cannot purchase coverage in excess of the
pecuniary loss L, an assumption that accords with the fact that we do not
observe insurers offering "pain and suffering" insurance in practice.' 3
In the state in which an injurer is liable for an accident, the judgment
against the injurer entered by a court is J. The judgment presumably exceeds
the pecuniary loss L because it contains an element of compensation for the
nonpecuniary loss. The injurer may be only partially solvent, however, so
the amount collectable from the injurer is only D < J. Without loss of generality, I assume that these damages are collected by the insured 4 and that
the insurer's "share" in accordance with its subrogation right appears as a
reduction in C,. Thus, we can interpret C, as net coverage, equal to C2 less
the amount received by the insurer in accordance with its subrogation rights
when an injurer is liable. By allowing the insured to select C, and C2 freely,
I am implicitly assuming that freedom of contract prevails and that the parties
to the insurance contract can choose the optimal amount for the insurer to
receive through subrogation.
The insured's optimization problem is then to select coverage levels C,
and C2 to maximize expected utility, subject to several constraints. This
problem can be written as
max (1 - p)u.(z
CihC2

-

7r) + p u,(z - ?r - L + C, + D) + p 2u(z
subject to

- ir -

L + C2),

pC, +p 2 C2 ,

ir =

C,, C 2

L,

C, C 2 >-0.
'

For an extensive discussion of whether consumers desire to purchase pain and suffering insurance

and whether the market is capable of supplying it, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Non-

pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785
(1995).
"4Thus, my model can be seen as one concerning the optimal level of reimbursement rather than
subrogation, but the two are analytically equivalent. The insured can typically collect from both the
insurer and the injurer in practice, by the way, because of the "collateral source rule," which holds
that an injured party's first-party insurance recovery does not reduce the liability of a tortfeasor.
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The first constraint states that the insurance premium is actuarially fair (equal
to expected payments by the insurer under the policy), so the insurer breaks
even on the contract. The second set of constraints states that coverage cannot
exceed the pecuniary loss. The third set of constraints states that coverage
is nonnegative.
The problem is a nonlinear programming problem. I give the solution in
some detail in the Appendix and simply provide a verbal summary of the
key results here. The results turn on how the nonpecuniary loss affects the
marginal utility of money. Although those effects might be complex in practice, I will consider three simple cases-where the marginal utility of money
remains the same, where it falls uniformly, and where it increases uniformly.
Optimal values of the choice variables are denoted with an asterisk.
1. Suppose first that u'(w) = u'(w). That is, suppose the nonpecuniary
loss takes the form of some fixed disutility that does not affect the marginal
utility of money. (This is true if we can write Un(W) = Ua(W) + K, where K
is a constant.)
In this case, the optimal insurance policy provides full coverage against
the pecuniary loss (C2 = L). Although I assume that insurance in excess of
this amount is unavailable, the insured would not wish to purchase it anyway
because coverage equal to the pecuniary loss is sufficient to equalize the
marginal utility of money across the no-accident and accident states of nature.
Furthermore, the optimal policy requires that any money collected from the
injurer be paid to the insurer as reimbursement up to the amount of the
pecuniary loss. Any excess over that amount goes to the insured. This leaves
the insured with the same marginal utility whether or not an injurer is liable
for the accident, except where the amount collected from the injurer exceeds
the pecuniary loss. In that event, the insured has a lower marginal utility of
money when an injurer is liable, but such a situation
is optimal given the
5
nonnegativity constraint on coverage (C, > 0). 1
2. Now suppose that the marginal utility of money in the no-accident state
exceeds the marginal utility of money in the accident states for given wealth:
u'(w) > u'(w), for all w. Intuitively, we might imagine that the accident renders
the insured less able to enjoy consumption expenditures (holding wealth
constant).
In this case, optimal insurance coverage will be less than the full amount
of the pecuniary loss and may be zero. The reason is that the reduction in
" Some readers may note a connection between this result and the considerable literature on the
difference between damages that provide optimal deterrence and damages that provide optimal
insurance. Perhaps the leading paper is Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ.
120 (1982). Where damages that are optimal for deterrence purposes must exceed damages that are
optimal for insurance purposes, some "decoupling" between damages paid by injurers and damages
received by victims may be desirable. Litigation costs also factor into such analyses. See, for example,
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and
Litigation, 22 Rand J. Econ. 562 (1991).
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the marginal utility of money caused by the accident makes it optimal for
the insured to consume more wealth in the no-accident state. Where insurance coverage is positive, the optimal amount for the insurer to receive
through subrogation is again equal to the collectable damages or the amount
of coverage payable when no injurer is liable, whichever is less-this again
equalizes the marginal utility of money across the accident states if possible
(subject to the nonnegativity constraint). Thus, as in case 1, the optimal
contract requires the insurer to be reimbursed fully for its outlays from the
recovery against the injurer before the insured receives anything from the
injurer. The made-whole doctrine, which imposes the opposite rule, is clearly
suboptimal.
3. Finally, suppose that the nonpecuniary loss increases the marginal utility
of money, holding wealth constant: u$,(w) < u'(w), for all w. Perhaps the
accident leaves the insured less able to enjoy inexpensive activities such as
walking and bicycling, and enjoyment must be found in more costly pursuits.
The increase in the marginal utility of money caused by the accident
increases the amount of insurance coverage that the insured would like to
carry to an amount in excess of the pecuniary loss. On the assumption that
the market will not sell such coverage, the insured will do as well as possible
by buying coverage equal to the pecuniary loss. In the accident state in which
an injurer is liable, the optimal amount payable to the insurer through subrogation may now be less than before-in effect, if the contract allows the
insured to keep some of the collectable damages before the insurer is
reimbursed, it may partially overcome the problem caused by the refusal
of insurers to sell the insured as much insurance as the insured wishes to
purchase.
The difference between this case and the prior two is driven by my assumption that the market will not sell coverage exceeding pecuniary losses,
even though such coverage is optimal in a first-best sense. Nothing in the
model explains the market's resistance to selling such coverage, but factors
outside the model may arise in practice to make coverage for nonpecuniary
losses unavailable. Within the model, this problem can be partly overcome
as noted by modifying the subrogation provision to allow the insured to
obtain more coverage than would otherwise be available in the state in which
an injurer is liable.
But this result should not be taken too seriously. First, it is unclear how
often the phenomenon that necessitates it-an increase in the marginal utility
of money because of an accident-will occur. Second, just as factors outside
the model must explain why insurers are unwilling to sell coverage in excess
of pecuniary losses, so might they argue against allowing the insured to
obtain such coverage in a roundabout fashion through a modification of the
subrogation rule. Certainly one can wonder whether a court can do better
than the parties to the insurance contract in designing the optimal subrogation
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arrangement for these cases. Notwithstanding the result here, therefore, I do
not regard it as an argument for judicial interference with freedom of contract
(more on this issue in the concluding section). The results as a whole for
the nonpecuniary loss model suggest that a rule under which the insurer takes
first from any damages collected from the injurer-the rule seemingly written
into many insurance contracts in practice-may well be optimal much of the
time.

II.

ACTUARIALLY "UNFAIR" PREMIUMS

When insurance is actuarially fair, a risk-averse insured will prefer to
purchase full coverage against pecuniary losses. The reason relates to the
fact that regardless of the amount of coverage purchased, the insured's expected wealth will be the same (the insurance policy has a net expected value
of zero). Hence, the risk-averse insured can eliminate all risk, and maintain
the same expected wealth, by purchasing full coverage-the insured will
surely wish to do so because the elimination of risk, holding expected wealth
constant, always raises expected utility for the risk averse.
In reality, of course, the expected value of insurance policies must be
negative on average. Insurers have administrative expenses that must be
covered, and their shareholders wish to earn a reasonable rate of return on
investment. Insurance premiums may also exceed actuarially fair levels because insureds are not perfectly separated by risk category, so at times relatively low risk insureds will be pooled with relatively high risk insureds.
When insurance premiums exceed the expected value of payments to the
insured under the policy, insureds may rationally purchase less than full
coverage against pecuniary losses.' 6 When such underinsurance is coupled
with a partially solvent injurer, we again confront the question of whether
the insurer or the insured should take first from the injurer's assets.
The formal treatment of this case is much the same as in the last section
but simpler, and the notation will remain the same except for the following
changes: we no longer need to consider nonpecuniary losses, so the utility
function is simply u(w). Furthermore, in the absence of nonpecuniary losses,
it is unnecessary to distinguish the judgment from the size of the pecuniary
loss. I thus assume that the judgment is now L, the value of the pecuniary
loss, and that the amount of damages collectable from the injurer is D < L.
To capture the notion that insurance premiums exceed the actuarially fair
level, I will assume that the premium for each dollar of coverage in each
16

This point can be found in numerous standard microeconomics textbooks. See, for example,

David M. Kreps, A Course on Microeconomic Theory 91-93 (1990); Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic
Analysis 180-81 (3d ed. 1992).
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state carries a "markup" of r.17 The constraints CI, C2 : L can also be dropped,
as they will be seen to be nonbinding at the optimum.
The insured's optimization problem is now
max(1 -p)u(z-

7r) + pu(z-

7r-

L + C, + D) + pzu(z-

7r-

L + C 2 ),

C1 . C 2

subject to 7r = p,(l + r)C, +p2(1 + -r)C2,
C1,

C

2

:O.

I again sketch the details of the solution in the Appendix. In words, the
insured purchases less than full coverage against pecuniary loss in this model.
Consequently, the insured will not equalize the marginal utility of wealth
across all states of nature but will have a higher marginal utility of wealth
in the accident states. The reason is that reductions in risk are accompanied
by reductions in expected wealth, and the insured must strike a trade-off
between the two. At the optimum, the insured will accept some reduction in
expected wealth to reduce risk but does not eliminate risk altogether because
it is too costly.
The optimal amount for the insurer to receive through subrogation will
equal the damages collectable from the injurer or the total amount of firstparty coverage payable for the accident, whichever is less (in other words,
the optimal contract will call for the insurer to be made whole before the
insured).'" Intuitively, it makes no sense to purchase more net coverage when
the injurer is liable than when no injurer is liable. Instead, subject to the
constraint that net coverage can never be negative, it is best to equalize the
marginal utility of money across the accident states by ensuring that the
insured's net wealth is the same in each.
"7Thus, I assume that insurance is actuarially unfair at the margin. By contrast, if actuarial
unfairness arose entirely as a fixed cost per policy that did not vary with the amount of coverage
purchased, one can readily show that rational insureds would still purchase full coverage if they
bought insurance at all. Then, the underinsurance problem essential to the tension between subrogation
and insolvency would not arise. The assumption that insurance premia are actuarially unfair at the
margin is a realistic one, I believe. As coverage increases, various costs of claims processing seem
likely to increase, such as the costs of investigating the validity of claimed casualty losses and
valuing them, the costs of processing claims for medical care, and so on.
'"A further implicit assumption of the model warrants brief discussion. Note that the markup r
is assumed to be the same for coverage in both states in which loss occurs. One could imagine that
administrative costs for the insurance company might be higher in the state in which an injurer is
liable, however, because of the costs of pursuing subrogation. The markup in that state, therefore,
might be assumed to be higher. I do not treat this case in detail here, but it is worth noting that if
the markup for coverage in the state in which an injurer is liable exceeds the markup in the other
state, the result that the insurer should be made whole before the insured is strengthened. The
intuition is that if the marginal price of coverage when an injurer is liable is greater than the marginal
price when no injurer is liable, the amount of coverage that an insured will purchase for the state
in which the injurer is liable declines relative to the amount the insured will purchase for the state
in which no injurer is liable.
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III.

MORAL HAZARD

When insurers cannot observe the precautionary behavior of their insureds
or when courts cannot verify precautionary behavior after the fact, it becomes
impossible for insurers and insureds to contract for jointly optimal precautions
against loss. And when insurance coverage cannot be conditioned on proper
precautions against loss, an externality arises (from the insured's perspective)
owing to the existence of insurance-the insured (typically) bears the costs
of precautions against loss, but the benefits of those precautions are realized
by the insurance company to the degree that the loss is insured. The result
is an insufficient incentive for the insured to take precautions, known as
"moral hazard."
Various responses to the moral hazard problem can be imagined. In some
cases, the insurer could bear the cost of the precautions. In others, some
observable and verifiable datum may exist (other than information on the
loss itself) that is imperfectly correlated with precautionary behavior, on
which coverage can be conditioned in whole or in part. Another response
(perhaps in conjunction with those above) is to leave some of the loss on
the insured to provide some incentive for the insured to take precautions
against loss.19 Where underinsurance arises for the purpose of reducing moral
hazard, we again confront the question of whether the insurer or the insured
should take first from the assets of a partially solvent injurer. A variant of
the model developed above will allow us to address the issue.
I will assume that utility takes the form v(w, x) = u(w) - m(x), where
u(w) is a strictly concave function of wealth as before, x is a nonmonetary

precautionary action that is continuously measurable, and m(x) is the utility
equivalent of that action. The probability of an accident is now p(x), a decreasing, convex function (additional precautions reduce the probability of an
accident, but at a decreasing rate). The accident causes a pecuniary loss of L,
as before. When an accident occurs, the probability that an injurer is liable is
a, and the probability that no injurer is liable is (1 - a). The damages collectable from the injurer are again D _<
L. In this model, I assume that insurance
premiums are actuarially fair.
The insured will select coverage levels C, and C2 and the precaution level
x to maximize expected utility. The "first-best" insurance contract would
simply maximize expected utility subject to the constraints that premiums
be actuarially fair and that coverages be nonnegative. This first-best optimum
" On the moral hazard problem generally and some of the devices for dealing with it, see generally
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. (1979); Mark V. Pauley, The
Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531 (1968); Stephen A. Ross, The
Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 134 (Papers & Proc.
1973); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541 (1979); Richard Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk-Spreading and Appropriate
Incentives, 2 J. Econ. Theory 10 (1970).
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is unattainable in practice, however, because the insured cannot be required
by contract to choose the first-best level of precautions. Instead, in choosing
precautions, the insured will take the level of coverage and the associated
insurance premium as parameters and choose a precaution level that is privately optimal. The fact that the insured will behave "selfishly" in this way
adds an additional constraint to the problem, which may now be written
max [1 - p(x)]u(z - 7r) + oxp(x)u(z - 7r - L + C, + D)
X, C1, C 2

+ (1 - o)p(x)u(z - 7r - L + C 2 ) - rx)

subject to 7r

= oxp(x)C +

(1 - ot)p(x)C 2 ,

C1, C 2 >0,

{aEv(w, x)/ax} I, = oap'u(z - r - L + C, + D)
+ (1 - c)p'u(z -

p'u(z

-

r)

-m'

ir - L + C 2 )
=

0.

The first constraint states that the insurance premium is actuarially fair. The
second constraints are the familiar nonnegativity restrictions on the level of
coverage. The third constraint states that the precaution level x must be "incentive compatible"; that is, it must maximize the insured's expected utility
taking the level of coverage and the insurance premium as parameters. For
simplicity, I assume that the solution entails an "interior" value of x, so additional constraints on its magnitude are unnecessary. I also omit the constraints
CI C 2 < L because they will be seen to be nonbinding at the optimum.
Although it is more complicated to derive (see the Appendix), the solution
here is almost identical for present purposes to the solution for the model
with actuarially unfair premiums. Because of moral hazard, full coverage
against pecuniary loss is undesirable. Instead, the insured will bear some loss
to induce greater care. The amount of the loss borne by the insured should
be the same whether or not an injurer is liable (subject to the nonnegativity
constraint on net coverage) to equalize the marginal utility of money to the
insured in the accident states. Thus, except where the recovery from the
injurer exceeds the amount paid out by the insurer, the amount recovered
from the injurer should be paid to the insurer rather than the insured. In all
events, the insurer will be made whole before the insured receives any portion
of the recovery.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS

In each of the cases considered save one, the optimal insurance contract
requires that the insurer be made whole from the assets of the partially solvent
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injurer before the insured receives anything. Such a requirement, of course,
is the precise opposite of the made-whole doctrine so prevalent in U.S. courts.
All of the results are driven by the fact that the optimal amount of loss for
the insured to bear does not vary according to whether an injurer happens
to be liable for harms to the insured. Thus, if it were optimal for the insured
to collect from the injurer and thereby receive more than the insured's firstparty insurance benefits when an injurer is liable, it would also be optimal
for the insured to have bought more insurance against the contingency that
the same injury would occur under circumstances in which no injurer is liable
(or has assets to satisfy a judgment).
The one exception considered in the formal analysis arose in the case in
which nonpecuniary losses from the injury increased the marginal utility of
money, thereby leading the insured to desire coverage in excess of pecuniary
losses, but the insurance market was assumed to be unwilling to sell the
insured an amount of coverage that exceeds pecuniary losses. Then, if the
insured can collect from the partially solvent injurer before the insurer, the
insured can in effect increase coverage in some states of nature toward the
level that the insured desires but that the market will not supply.
This last result is generalizable to other circumstances in which the market
will not supply the "first-best" amount of coverage. For example, imagine a
small company with one or two workers. Perhaps the workers would like to
obtain disability insurance against the possibility that an injury will leave
them unable to work. Yet it is conceivable that disability insurers will not
accept business from such small firms (I have no idea whether this is true
in practice) because of the adverse-selection problem-they may be afraid
that anyone who applies for insurance will represent an exceptionally high
risk.2" Here again, by allowing the insured to collect from the partially solvent
injurer ahead of (say) the insured's health insurer, that insurer in effect sells
some of the desired disability insurance that the market will not otherwise
supply."1

In these types of cases, courts could in theory make insureds better off
by allowing them to take first from the assets of a partially solvent injurer.
Insurance companies would presumably charge them for the privilege through
higher premiums, of course, but by hypothesis insureds are willing to pay a
competitive price for such coverage and simply cannot obtain it. Furthermore,
the problem is one that, by definition, is unlikely to be susceptible to a
contractual solution. Insurers will no more make exceptions to their usual
20More precisely, the market may have "unraveled" because of insurers' prior experience, which

led to losses, premium increases, and the further exodus of low-risk insureds. The classic exposition
is Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay
on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. Econ. 629 (1976). Of course, market solutions
to the adverse-selection problem can and do emerge.
2 This scenario is easy to formalize as well. I will supply the details to any interested readers.
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subrogation provisions to make up for their unwillingness to supply more
coverage than they will sell the desired coverage in the first place.
To say that courts can improve matters in theory, however, hardly establishes that they can do so in practice. Most fundamental, how can a court
identify insureds who should be able to buy more coverage when insurers
are unable to identify them? The same information problems that impede
insurers must also afflict courts, and indeed courts may be at an added
disadvantage because they lack the actuarial experience and savvy of insurers.
If subtle subrogation rules might in theory be used to ameliorate a "market
failure" elsewhere, therefore, that failure seems to be one that courts cannot
hope to fix in practice.
Furthermore, with reference to the existing state of the law, the madewhole doctrine seems seriously at odds with sound policy. The analysis here
suggests that the opposite rule-that the insurer should be made whole
first-will be best for insureds except when the insured is unable to purchase
efficient amounts of insurance coverage. I can imagine no basis for thinking
that that situation is the rule rather than the exception.
These conclusions hold whether the subrogation rights in question arise
by operation of contract or at common law. Accordingly, it provides support
for a default rule at common law that allows insurers to be made whole first,
as well as for the enforcement of express contractual provisions that provide
for that arrangement.
APPENDIX
I.

NONPECUNIARY LosSES

Substitute the first cohstraint into the objective function and formulate the Lagrangean:
L = (1 -P)U(Z- pC - p 2 C 2 )
-p

2C 2

+ P 2 Ua(Z -PICi

-p

2 C2 -

+ X,(L-

C,) + X2 (L-

The Kuhn-Tucker necessary (and sufficient
can then be written as
aL/aC, = -p(I -p)un(z - p p 2 ua((z-7r-

C >0,
22 The

- L + C, + D)

+ p.u.(z-pC

22

L + C 2)

C2 ).

in this case) conditions for an optimum

r) +p,(I -p,)u'(z - 7r - L + C, + D)

(Al)

L+ C2 ) - Xt _<0;

C(aL/aC,) = 0;

(A2)

objective function is strictly concave in the choice variables, and the constraints are linear,

so the problem satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem. See, for example, Alpha C. Chiang,
Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics 722 (2d ed. 1974).
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aL/aC2

=

-p 2(l -p)u'(z
+ P2(l -p

2 )u

C 2 >_0,
L - C,> 0,

- 7r) -ptp 2u'(z - ir - L + C, + D)

(z-- 7r-L+ C 2)-

X2 :<!0

C 2(aL/aC 2 ) = 0,
X, > 0,

X,(L - C,) = 0.

(A4)
(A5)

Conjecture that the solution is interior. With both coverage levels positive, conditions (Al) and (A3) hold with equality. An interior solution implies further that
the X, terms equal zero. Divide p, out of condition (A 1) and P 2 out of condition (A3),
then subtract (A3) from (Al) to establish that u'(z - ir - L + C, + D) = u,(z - L + C2 ). Substituting this result back into condition (Al) further implies
u',(z - 7r) = u'(z -

r - L + C, + D) = u'(z - 7r - L + C2 ).

(A6)

In words, if the solution is interior, then the marginal utility of money must be
equalized across all states of nature. Were it otherwise, the insured could profit by
shifting money from a low marginal utility state to a high marginal utility state
through adjustments in coverage levels.
Furthermore, condition (A6) establishes that C1* = C* - D. In words, the optimal
amount for the insurer to receive through subrogation is D, the amount of damages
collected from the injurer. This will be true regardless of the value of D-that is,
regardless of the degree to which the injurer is insolvent.
Although we have characterized an interior solution, we have not established that
the interior solution is feasible (recall that any solution satisfying the necessary
conditions is indeed an optimum because the necessary conditions are here sufficient).
Its feasibility will depend on the relation between u,(w) and u.(w), as well as on the
magnitude of D.
1. Suppose that u',(w)= ua(w). The optimal contract provides C; = L and
C = max [L - D, 0].
Proof. Condition (A6) implies C; = L (full coverage against pecuniary loss)
and C,* = L - D. For this solution to satisfy nonnegativity, we must in turn have
D < L-the collectable damages are less than the pecuniary loss. When collectable
damages exceed the pecuniary loss L, the optimum becomes C,* = 0 (this follows
from the fact that condition (Al) is negative evaluated at C, = 0 and from the
nonnegativity constraint). Q.E.D.
2. Suppose that u',(w)> u'(w), for all w. The optimal contract here provides
C; < L and C,* = max [C; - D, 0]. It is possible that C* = C,* = 0.
Proof. Conjecture once again that an interior solution arises. Condition (A6)
again implies that C,* = C2 - D. It further implies that C2 < L because utility is
strictly concave. If this solution is to be the optimum, the marginal utility of coverage
C2 must be positive at C2 = 0: from condition (A3), one can deduce that u,(z)>
u'(z - L) is necessary. Were it otherwise, the purchase of insurance would transfer
wealth from a high marginal utility state to a low marginal utility state. Assuming
that C, > 0 (subrogation is uninteresting unless some insurance is purchased), then
a contract in which C1* = C2 - D will be feasible if D < C2. Otherwise, C,* = 0 for
the same reason as before. Q.E.D.
3. Suppose that u',(w) < u'(w), for all w. The optimal contract requires C2 = L
and C,* E [0, L].
Proof. Condition (A6) now requires u',(z - 7r) = u'(z - r - L + C2) = C 2 > L,
which is impermissible, so C2 = L and X 2 > 0. Conditions (A1) and (A3) now imply

HeinOnline -- 30 J. Legal Stud. 397 2001

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

C,* > L - D or conceivably C,* = L, depending on the degree to which the marginal
utility of money in the accident states exceeds the marginal utility of money in the
no-accident state. But if the recovery from the injurer exceeds L by a sufficient
amount, it is still possible to have C,* = 0. Q.E.D.

II.

ACTUARIALLY UNFAIR PREMIUMS

The optimal contract in this model will provide that C <L and C,* =
max [C* - D, 0].
Proof (Sketch).
The solution procedure is as before. Using the analogs to conditions (Al) and (A3) above (the necessary conditions are once again sufficient), one
can derive that, for an interior solution, u'(z - r - L + C, + D) = u'(z - 7r - L +
C2 ) or that C* = C, - D. This interior solution will be feasible as long as C2 D > 0. Intuitively, the insured once again equalizes the marginal utility of money in
the accident states if it is possible to do so-the optimality of doing so follows from
the fact that the markup per dollar of coverage is the same in both states.
Substituting this result into the analog to condition (Al) and rearranging terms
yields, for an interior solution,
u'(z - 7r - L + C 2 )u'(z - 7r)

=

(I - p + 7"- pr)/(l - p - pr)> 1.

From the concavity of u(w), it follows that C2 < L at the optimum. We already
know that C,* = C - D as long as the nonnegativity constraint is satisfied. It is
trivial to show that C* = 0 otherwise. Q.E.D.
III.
MORAL HAZARD
The optimal contract in this model will provide that C2 <L and C* =
max [C* - D, 0].
Proof. The Kuhn-Tucker sufficiency theorem is not in general satisfied for this
problem, but I will assume that the first-order conditions have a unique solution.
Substitute the first constraint into the objective function and formulate the Lagrangean:
L = [1 - p(x)]u[z - Cp(x)CI - (1 - a)p(x)C 2]

+ Cep(x)u[z - ap(x)C - (1 - a)p(x)C2 - L + C, + D]
+ (1 - a)p(x)u[z - cep(X)Cl - (1 - cOp(x)C2 - L + C, + D] - m(x)
+ X{Cp'u[z - ap(x)C - (1 - a)p(x)C 2 - L + C, + D]

+ (1 - a)p'u[z - p(x)CI - (1 - C)p(x)C2 - L + C, + D]
- p'u[z - oap(X)Cl - (1 - a)p(x)C 2] - M').

It will suffice to write the analogs to conditions (Al) and (A3) above (replacing the
expression for 7r for notational simplicity):
aL/aC, = -(1 - p)oepu'(z - 7r) + ap(l - ap)u'(z - 7r - L + C, + D)
-

(1 - cp)aepu'(z - 7r - L + C 2 )

+ X[oap'(1 - ap)u'(z - ir - L + C, + D)
- (1 - oa)p'(aep)u(z - 7r - L + C 2)
+ p'cpu'(z - 7r)] < 0
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and

aL/aC, = -[1 -p](l - c)pu'(z - 7r)

-

ap(l - a)pu'(z - 7r - L + C, + D)
r- L + C2 )

+ (1 - a)p[l - (1 -a )plu'(z-

+ X{-ap'(1 - a)pu'(z - 7r - L + C, + D)

(A3')

+ (1 - o)p'[1 - ( - a)p]u'(z - 7r - L + C2 )
+ p'(l - a)pu'(z - 7r)1 _ 0.
Conjecture an interior solution. Divide (Al') by ap and (A3') by (1 - a)p, then
subtract (A3') from (Al '). After considerable algebra, one obtains

{u'(z - 7r - L + C, + D) - u'(z - 7r - L + C2)}[I + Xp'p] = 0,
which implies u'(z - 7r - L + C, + D) = u'(z - 7r - L + C2 ). Again, unless the nonnegativity constraint on C, prevents it, the insured will want to equalize marginal
utility across the accident states, and C, = C, - D.
Substituting this result into (Al') yields, again after considerable algebra,

(1 - p)[u'(z - 7r - L + C, + D) - u'(z - 7r)]
+ (Xp'/ap){(l - p)[oa(1 -

z)]u'(z - 7r - L + CI + D)

+ aepu'(z - ?r - L + C2)} = 0.
The second term is negative, implying that the first term is positive and, hence,
u'(z - 7r - L + C, + D) > u'(z - 7r).
In words, the marginal utility of money in the accident state in which an injurer
is liable (equal to the marginal utility in the other accident state for an interior solution)
must exceed the marginal utility of money in the no-accident state. Using the concavity of u(w), we can deduce that the wealth of the insured is lower in the accident
states. Thus, for the interior solution, we have CI* + D = C* < L.
This contract is feasible as long as it obeys the nonnegativity constraint on C.
Otherwise (and I omit the details of the derivation), we have CI* = 0. Q.E.D.

HeinOnline -- 30 J. Legal Stud. 399 2001

HeinOnline -- 30 J. Legal Stud. 400 2001

